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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, the fast penetration of the Internet and the digiti-
zation of information products (music, movies, books and software) have led an
increasing number of consumers to copy and distribute information products with-
out the authorization of their legal owners, a phenomenon known as `digital piracy'.
Content industries (with record companies at the forefront) were quick to blame
digital piracy for huge revenue losses and to take legal actions against le-sharing
technologies and their users. Policy makers also reacted by gradually reinforcing
copyright law. In general, digital technologies and the Internet have deeply modied
the interaction between copyright holders, technology companies and consumers,
thereby posing interesting challenges for the economic analysis of digital products.
For instance, formal analysis is needed to examine the eect of digital piracy on
right-holders' prots; also, if digital piracy has a negative impact on the produc-
ers, one needs to analyze the strategies that can be used to counter piracy. As
importantly, a public policy perspective has to be taken; here, the main issue is
to evaluate the extent to which social interests are aligned with the interests of
copyright owners.
This article reviews recent theoretical contributions on these issues. As back-
ground information, we elaborate in Section 2 on the reasons for intellectual prop-
erty protection, report a few facts about copyright protection, and examine reasons
to become a digital pirate. In Section 3, we provide an exploration of the conse-
quences of digital piracy. To this purpose, we present a base model and then provide
several extensions: Consumer sampling, network eects, and indirect appropriation.
Section 4 takes a closer look at market-structure implications of end-user piracy.
Section 5 reviews the rather short literature on commercial piracy, which has to in-
clude strategic considerations by the pirates. Section 6 discusses contributions that,
in addition to price, consider alternative responses to piracy. Section 7 concludes,
taking a quick look at emerging new business models.
2. The protection of intellectual property and digital content
What is exactly digital piracy? Why is illegal? To answer these questions, we
need to describe the legislation that piracy violates. We also need to understand
the raison d'^ etre and the recent developments of this legislation. Finally, we need
to analyze what brings people to become digital pirates.
2.1. Intellectual property protection: Why and how. Intellectual property
(IP) refers to the legal rights that result from intellectual activity in the industrial,
scientic, literary and artistic elds. Most countries have adopted laws to protect
intellectual property, with the objective to promote innovation and aesthetic cre-
ativity. The economic rationale can be summarized as follows. Intellectual creations
have a public good nature: They are nonrival (their consumption by one person
does not prevent their consumption by another person) and, often, nonexcludable
(one person cannot exclude another person from their consumption). The latter
property reduces the incentives to create, as creators face diculties in appropriat-
ing the revenues of their creation. This causes an underproduction problem that IP
law addresses by making intellectual creations excludable by legal means. That is,
IP law grants exclusive use of the protected creation to the creator, which restores
the incentives to create. However, by granting monopoly rights to the creator, IP2 PAUL BELLEFLAMME AND MARTIN PEITZ
law entails an underutilization problem. Indeed, as the marginal cost of produc-
tion is zero (which is a consequence of nonrivalness), any positive price induces
a welfare-reducing rationing. There is thus a conict, as pointed out by Arrow
(1962), between dynamic eciency considerations (how to provide the right incen-
tives to create and innovate?), and static eciency considerations (how to promote
the diusion and use of the results of creation and innovation?). In order to strike
a balance between these two conicting problems, IP law grants exclusive rights
only for a limited period of time and for a limited scope.
1
The IP protection legislation generally distinguishes among four separate IP
regimes, which are targeted at dierent subject matters. On the one hand, patents,
trade secrets and trademarks are designed to protect industrial property (such as
inventions, processes, machines, brand names, industrial designs,...). On the other
hand, copyrights concern literary, musical, choreographic, dramatic and artistic
works (such as novels, poems, plays, lms, songs, drawings, paintings, photographs,
sculptures, architectural designs, ...). It is with this so-called \copyright branch of
IP" that we are concerned here. Piracy can indeed be dened as the unauthorized
reproduction, use, or diusion of a copyrighted work. Copyright applies to the
expression of works, in whatever mode or form, and gives authors an exclusive
right over the reproduction, performance, adaptation and translation of their work.
Compared to patents, this protection is weaker (as only the expression is protected,
and not the underlying ideas) but it is extended over a longer period of time.
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2.2. Recent changes in copyright law. The challenges brought by the emer-
gence of digital technologies and the Internet have triggered many of the recent
changes in copyright law.
3 Digital technologies have enabled the low-cost and high-
quality reproduction of copyrighted works (in particular, music and movies), leading
to their complete dematerialization; the Internet has further facilitated consumers'
ability to nd and redistribute digital content. These two trends have seriously
limited copyright owners in their ability to control how content gets to consumers.
This has undermined the existing business models, which were relying on controlled
distribution and broadcast channels. In the past, as long as illegal copies were ex-
pensive to make, of drastically inferior quality, or, at least, limited in scale, end-user
piracy did not pose a major threat.
Before devising new business models (see Section ??), content providers and
copyright owners have tried to prevent the old ones from crashing down, mainly by
pursuing copyright infringers and by using digital technologies as protective mea-
sures (see Section ??). They have also lobbied for|and obtained|more restrictive
laws for their protection. In the U.S., two major changes occured in 1998: First, the
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA, aka Sonny Bono Copyright Act) extended
the duration of existing U.S. copyrights by 20 years; second, the Digital Millenium
1For more on this topic, see, e.g., Belleamme and Peitz (2010, Chapter 19).
2Currently, copyright protection lasts for 70 years after the author's death in both the European
Union and the United States. For sound recordings and lm, it lasts, in general, for 50 years after
publication in the European Union and for 95 years in the United States|see European Parliament
and Council of the European Union (2006) and Hirtle (2010). It is proposed to extend protection
in the European Union to 95 years|see European Commission (2008).
3For a thorough description, see Gasser (2005a and b).DIGITAL PIRACY: THEORY 3
Copyright Act (DMCA) reinforced copyright protection by making it a crime to
circumvent the technological measures that control access to copyrighted work.
4
In Europe, a number of EU directives have lead EU member states to harmonize
their national copyright laws in the rst half of the 1990s. Worth mentioning is the
European Union Copyright Directive (EUCD) of 2001, which, in the spirit of the
DMCA, requires member states to enact provisions preventing the circumvention of
technical protection measures (leaving, however, siginicant leeway to the member
states to dene the scope of their protections).
More recently, a number of countries have passed laws aiming at ghting Internet
piracy. France opened the way by adopting in September 2009 a legislation that
authorizes the suspension of Internet access to pirates who ignored two warnings to
quit. The UK followed suit in April 2010 with a legislation incorporating a similar
\Three Strikes" provision.
5 In the US, the Obama administration is reported to
examine this possibility as well.
6 In Sweden, a new law allows copyright holders to
obtain a court order forcing ISPs to provide the IP addresses identifying computers
of illegal le-sharers.
7
2.3. Becoming digital pirate. What brings people to engage in the illegal act of
digital piracy? To answer this question, we need to separate commercial (for-prot)
piracy from end-user piracy. As far as commercial piracy is concerned, the motiva-
tion is clearly criminal: The large-scale reproduction and distribution of copyrighted
products generates the sort of high prot margins that criminal organizations are af-
ter. On the other hand, understanding the motivations behind end-user piracy{i.e.,
illegal reproduction of copyrighted work by the consumer themselves{is much more
complex. It is indeed surprising to observe such large-scale violation of the laws
protecting digital products by individuals who are normally law-abiding citizens.
A number of explanations have been advanced. First, the lack of clarity of the
laws can be blamed. In particular, there exist limitations to a copyright holder's
exclusive rights that are not clearly dened. One such limitation is \fair use", which
permits the limited use of a copyrighted work without requiring the creator's au-
thorization.
8 Fair use includes certain personal uses, but the contours of these uses
are typically hard to dene in the digital world where technologies are evolving
4Voices were raised against these more restrictive laws, arguing that they were likely to stie
rather than foster creation. For instance, seventeen economists (among them ve Nobel laureates)
condemned the CTEA on the grounds that the economic benets from copyright extension were
very unlikely to outweigh the costs (see Eldred et al. vs. Ashcroft, Attorney General, 537 U.S.
186, 2003). A more fundamental critique of copyright protection is provided by Boldrin and
Levine (2008). They essentially argue that copyright protection sties creativity and innovation
and hurts consumers also in the long run.
5The `Digital Economy Bill' has been passed by the Lords on April 6, 2010. At the time of
this writing, it has not yet been examined by the Commons.
6See \Obama administration steps up anti-piracy plan" by A.B. Block
(www.hollywoodreporter.com, June 22, 2010; last consulted on July 23, 2010).
7It was estimated that Internet trac fell by one third on the day the new law came into eect
(i.e., April 1, 2009; see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7978853.stm, last consulted on July 23, 2010).
8The \fair use" doctrine is embedded in American copyright law. In the European Union the
right of the rights holder are also limited, in particular, for a \private copy" (copie priv ee), which
allows the copying of copyrighted material except software for personal use.4 PAUL BELLEFLAMME AND MARTIN PEITZ
rapidly. Consumers may thus consider certain uses of copyrighted works fair, al-
though these uses are actually illegal.
9 Second, following Becker (1968), we can
simply see end-user piracy as the normal reaction of rational agents who compare
the costs and benets of this activity. Even if they are aware of breaking the law,
consumers perceive as very remote the sanctions that they may encounter if they
are caught buying or making copies. The benets, on the other hand, are obvious
as free downloads and copying technologies are ubiquitous. The literature that we
review in the next sections embraces this view. However convincing this economic
explanation may be, it still falls short of explaining why many individuals infringe
copyright law but not other laws (for which a similar pattern of low risks and high
rewards could be observed). To solve this puzzle, Balestrino (2008) proposes a
theoretical model of digital piracy combined with a game-theoretic mechanism of
social norm formation. He argues that no social stigma is attached to digital piracy
because it has no perceived social cost; as a result, there is no pressure to build
a norm condemning it.
10 Also, the literature typically does not explain why indi-
viduals upload copyrighted material even though that puts them at greater risk of
being investigated for copyright infringement and does not give them any direct
benet.
11
We now move to the economic analysis of digital piracy (essentially, end-user
piracy, on which the literature has mostly focused; we briey consider commercial
piracy in Section ??).
3. Profit and welfare effects of end-user piracy
In this section, we study the impacts of end-user piracy on rms' prots and
strategies.
12 We also examine how piracy aects welfare, both in the short and in the
long run. We start with a basic analysis in which the monopoly producer of a digital
product faces the threat of copying by the consumers. Copying undermines the
producer's ability to appropriate the returns from its creation. Hence, applying the
reasoning behind the protection of IP, we expect that more piracy (i.e., less eective
copyright protection) will improve welfare from a static eciency perspective but
may deteriorate it if we include dynamic eciency considerations. We move then
to models that present piracy under a more favorable angle. Several reasons are put
forward to explain how piracy may increase the copyright holder's prots, thereby
having the potential to enhance both short- and long-run welfare. Note that the
models reviewed in this second subsection (at one exception) also consider settings
with a single digital product supplied by a monopolist. We defer the analysis of
settings with several products and producers to Section ??.
9Gasser (2005a) reports survey results that partially conrm this interpretation. In a recent
paper, Chiang and Assane (2009) present an empirical analysis of the factors inuencing the
willingness to pay for digital music downloads. They show that income and risk perceptions play
a dominant role. They also review the empirical literature focusing on the determinants of piracy.
10See also Hill (2007) who looks at the behavior of individual consumers and tries to uncover
why they knowingly consume pirated goods. Some of the actions of, e.g., the RIAA are intended
to \educate" consumers in the sense that it is attempted to attach social stigma to digital piracy.
11Uploaders in a le-sharing network contribute to a public good from the viewpoint of the
other users of that network. A somewhat dierent but related phenomenon consists in providing
user-generated content.
12The section partly draws on Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006b).DIGITAL PIRACY: THEORY 5
3.1. A rst analysis. The basic analysis of end-user piracy considers the market
for a digital product supplied by a single producer. The assumption of a monopoly
greatly simplies the analysis and can be justied by arguing that digital products
(e.g., music titles or movies) are suciently horizontally dierentiated to make
the demand for any particular product largely independent of the prices of other
products in the same category. The monopolist faces, however, another form of
competition: Along the original les that the monopolist supplies, there also exist
(illegal) digital copies of these les. That is, the market oers two versions of the
product, the original and a copy. It is usually assumed that these two versions
are vertically dierentiated: The original has quality q, while the copy may be of
lower quality, qc  q. The monopolist chooses the price, and possibly the quality,
of the original. As for the copy, it can be obtained at a given price, which may
vary across consumers. This price may be zero; it is positive if the pirated good is
costly to acquire or if there is an expected cost from being detected. The quality
of the copy primarily depends on technological and legal factors. The government
(through the denition and the enforcement of IP protection) and the monopolist
(through technical protective measures) have the potential to aect both the price
and the quality of copies.
In some situations the pirated good is of higher quality (qc > q). Two examples
for this: First, this can be the case in a quality dimension which may be called
versatility. Such a situation arises if the original is DRM-protected, whereas the
copy is not.13 DRM-protection often restricts the use of a product and, thus, its
versatility. For instance, DRM-protected songs purchased on iTunes did not play
on an incompatible mp3-device. Second, the quality dimension may be availability.
Originals may only be available as bundles, as is the case for some music albums
which artists refuse to make available for download per song. Also, some originals
may be released later than pirated versions, as is the case for many lms on DVD.
3.1.1. Basic insights. A general result that we can expect in such a framework is
that piracy limits the monopoly power of the supplier of the original. As a conse-
quence, the availability of digital copies at best leaves the rm's prots unchanged
(meaning that piracy is not a real threat) or, more realistically, reduces the rm's
prots. This is indeed the conclusion reached in a variety of models (see, for in-
stance, Novos and Waldman, 1984, Johnson, 1985, and Belleamme, 2003). When
price is the only strategic variable of the rm, three types of reactions are possible:
If piracy is not a real threat (because copies have too low a quality/price ratio), no
reaction is necessary (piracy is said to be `blockaded'); otherwise, the rm either
reduces its price to make all active consumers prefer the original (a `deterrence'
strategy), or it sets a larger price and lets some consumers use the pirated good
(an `accommodation' strategy). Inevitably, prots are reduced in both the deter-
rence and the accommodation strategy. The reduction in the monopolist's prots,
however, are more than compensated by the increase in consumer surplus. From a
static eciency point of view, piracy is thus welfare-enhancing.
The conclusion may dier when dynamic eciency is taken into consideration.
Reductions in prots typically aect incentives to provide quality. In a model
in which original and copy have the same quality but in which consumers have
13DRM stands for digital rights management, which is an umbrella term for a number of
technologies that inhibits uses of digital content not desired or intended by the copyright holder
(see Subsection ?? for more on this topic).6 PAUL BELLEFLAMME AND MARTIN PEITZ
heterogeneous copying costs, Novos and Waldman (1984) show how lower prots
reduce, under some assumptions, the ex ante incentives to provide quality. This
result is conrmed by Bae and Choi (2006) in a vertical product dierentiation
model with quality degradation for copies. In a multi-product framework, Johnson
(1985) shows how lower prots also reduce the incentives to provide variety. This
implies that although a short-term welfare analysis may see piracy in a favorable
light, the long-term eects are more likely to be negative.
3.1.2. Impacts of piracy on strategies and welfare. Let us now develop the previous
argument in more detail and examine the strategies that producers of digital prod-
ucts can adopt in the face of piracy. We follow Novos and Waldman (1984) in giving
the following alternative to the consumer: She can either purchase the original or
she can copy at a cost c+z (1 + x), where c is the marginal cost of production, x is
the extent of copyright protection, and z is the additional marginal cost of making
a copy; the latter cost is assumed to be heterogeneous across consumers. What
Novos and Waldman had in mind in 1984 was clearly physical copies. Yet, their
specication also ts digital products. Think, e.g., of software: Downloading and
installing illegaly copied les require time and eort for the users (c); moreover, in
the case they are caught copying les, users incur an additional cost (a ne or the
disutility from having the product conscated, z); the likelihood and the magnitude
of this cost depend on the extent of copyright protection (x).
In this setting, for moderate prices of the original in a protected monopoly, those
consumers with a low enough copying cost prefer the copy to the original. The rm
can make copying unattractive to all consumers by setting a suciently low price.
This deterrence strategy might, however, be too costly to the monopolist who will
then prefer to raise the price and accommodate piracy. In any case, prots are lower
than if piracy was not a threat. Novos and Waldman establish that the monopolist
provides too low a quality compared to the social optimum; this is because piracy
prevents the monopolist from appropriating all rents from quality improvements.
One could therefore expect that a stronger copyright protection, making piracy
less attractive, would induce the monopolist to increase the quality oered. Novos
and Waldman show that this is indeed the case provided that there are relatively
more consumers with higher than with lower copying costs (i.e., the density of z
needs to be increasing). Note that the reinforcement of copyright protection does
not hinder static eciency in this model (an increase in x makes consumers switch
from the copy to the original, thus saving the copying cost that is wasteful from
a social point of view). It follows then that making copyright protection stronger
and/or enforcing it more strictly is unambiguously welfare-enhancing in Novos and
Waldman's model (as long as the density of z is increasing).
However, the latter conclusion is not robust to a slight modication of the setup.
Novos and Waldman assume that copies have the same quality as the original, and
that copying costs vary across consumers. Alternatively, we could assume that the
value of the original relative to the copy is heterogeneous but that the associated
disutility of copying is the same for all consumers. In that scenario, all consumers
attach the same value to the original but vary in the value they attach to the copy;
namely, the value of the copy for consumer z is equal to the value of the original
minus z (1 + x). Heterogenity in the copying costs is thus replaced by heterogene-
ity in the perceived quality degradation of the copy. The setup then follows the
vertical dierentiation model of Mussa and Rosen (1978). Two specications of theDIGITAL PIRACY: THEORY 7
heterogeneity of consumers' valuations dominate the literature: (i) Discrete types
(namely two types, high-valuation and low-valuation consumers); (ii) a continuum
of types (the distribution is then typically assumed to be uniform on an interval).
Yoon (2002), Belleamme (2003), and Bae and Choi (2006) consider a single-
product monopolist selling to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. A consumer
derives utility q   p for the original, where  is the consumer's taste parameter,
distributed on the unit interval, q is the quality of the original, and p its price.14 She
derives utility q c for the copy, where 1  is the factor of quality depreciation
and c, the copying cost. We check thus that consumers are heterogeneous in terms of
the valuation of the quality dierential between original and copy (i.e., (1   )q,
which Bae and Choi call the `degradation cost' of piracy) and homogeneous in
terms of the copying cost (i.e, c, the `reproduction cost' of piracy in Bae and Choi's
terminology). We also see that pricing in the presence of piracy is the same as
pricing against a rm pricing at c a product of quality q. Obviously, in this setup
the rm's prots decrease with the availability of digital copies.15
When analyzing the (short-run and long-run) welfare eects of piracy, Bae and
Choi (2006) argue that Novos and Waldman's conclusion is particular to their mod-
eling framework. They show indeed that the welfare eects of a stronger copyright
protection crucially depend on how the two types of costs associated to piracy are
aected. The reason is that these two costs impact the demand for a legal copy in
dierent ways: A change in the constant reproduction cost induces a parallel shift
of the demand function, whereas a change in the degradation cost makes the de-
mand curve pivot. In particular, if we are in a situation when the monopolist nds
it optimal to accommodate piracy, a strengthening of IP protection aects welfare
dierently depending on the piracy cost that is increased: A higher degradation
cost results in higher quality and lower consumption of the original product, while
a higher reproduction cost induces exactly the opposite. It may even be the case
that a higher reproduction cost unambiguously reduces social welfare as both static
and dynamic eciency are negatively aected.
In Bae and Choi's analysis, a stronger IP protection is modeled as a marginal
increase of either the degradation cost or the reproduction cost of piracy. This
conveniently abstracts away the issues of where the increased protection comes from
(legal and/or technical measures?) and how much it costs (public and/or private
costs?). Yoon (2002) partially addresses these issues. In his setting, copyright
protection leads to a private cost to consumers. Formally, a consumer's utility takes
the form q c x, where x denotes the consumers' additional cost due to copyright
protection (which also constitutes a social cost). In this setting, an increase in
x leads to an increase in the monopolist's prots and to a decrease in consumer
surplus. As for (short-run) total surplus, it is initially decreasing in x and then, after
reaching its minimum, is inversely U-shaped. Yoon then shows that the socially
optimal copyright protection should be set such that the monopolist optimally
reacts by deterring copying. The copyrighted product is then fully protected in the
14Yoon (2002) and Belleamme (2003) both assume a uniform distribution of the taste pa-
rameter and an exogenously given quality of the original; Bae and Choi (2006) consider a more
general class of distributions and also endogenize the monopolist's quality choice.
15Although prots are reduced in the monopoly setting, committing not to enforce copyright
protection may be a protable strategy in a market with potential entry as it may serve as an
entry deterrent. The reason is that an entrant suers if the incumbent does not enforce copyright
protection.8 PAUL BELLEFLAMME AND MARTIN PEITZ
sense that copies are driven out of the market. However, the monopolist has to
lower its price compared to a situation of `blockaded entry', which occurs if copying
is not feasible. Thus prots generated by the copyrighted product are reduced
under the social optimum.
Chen and Png (2002) also take the costs of stronger IP protection into account.
In particular, they consider the social costs that arise when rms spend resources
on detecting copyright infringers. They consider a setting with two groups of con-
sumers: One group has innite copying costs and therefore never copies, while
the other group has nite copying costs and may therefore prefer to copy. Within
each group, consumers have heterogeneous valuations for the good, although orig-
inals and copies are identical. The expected utility from illegal copying depends
on the detection probability. This leaves two possibilities to the monopolist to
eliminate copies: It can either lower its price or increase the detection probability
by spending resources in some anti-piracy technology. The implications of these
two strategies clearly dier from a social point of view: Short-run welfare is unam-
biguously improved if the price is lowered (because less eort in copying is needed)
but is deteriorated if the detection probability is increased (because the technology
costs are wasteful from a social point of view and because the surplus of copiers is
also reduced).16
Summary. The basic models we have reviewed here consider end-user piracy under
the following set of assumptions: (i) A monopoly supplies a single original prod-
uct, (ii) copies are viewed as a lower-quality variant of the original product, (iii)
consumers are heterogeneous (either with respect to their cost of making or ac-
quiring copies, or to their valuation of the quality degradation between originals
and copies). In these models, consumers with a low cost of copying or with a low
willingness to pay for quality may prefer to consume the copy. The copy competes
thus with the original, which forces the monopolist to lower its price (otherwise,
the incentive constraint of too many consumers would be violated). From a static
eciency point of view, the presence of pirated copies leads to an expansion of
the market and, thereby, to an increase in consumer surplus. This has to be bal-
anced, in a dynamic eciency perspective, with the reduced incentives to improve
the quality of the original product (as a result of the reduction in the copyright
holder's prots). Moreover, the analysis of total welfare must also incorporate a
number of costs associated to piracy: The costs for consumers of making copies
compared to the marginal cost of production of originals; the costs for rms of
technical measures to protect products against copying; the costs for governments
to enforce copyrights. If these costs are high, society may prefer to adopt little or
no protection (because of the low performance, at least in a short-run view, of the
combination of protection policies and the prot-maximizing behavior of copyright
owners).
As we now show, some of these conclusions may not carry over in environments
where original products are made available in several versions.
3.1.3. Price discrimination. So far, it has been assumed that original digital prod-
ucts are oered in a single version. Although pirated versions are available on the
market, these versions are imposed upon the copyrights holder. In many instances,
16Chen and Png then analyze the socially optimal government policy consisting of a tax on
copies and recording equipment, subsidies to originals, and penalties in case of copyright violations.DIGITAL PIRACY: THEORY 9
however, producers of digital products deliberately oer the original in dierent ver-
sions in an attempt to capture a larger share of consumer surplus through (second-
degree) price discrimination.17 It is therefore important to analyze the link between
end-user piracy and the rms' versioning strategies.
Alvisi, Argentesi and Carbonara (2002) analyze the incentives of a rm facing
piracy to oer a downgraded version.18 They adopt a vertical dierentiation set-
ting  a la Mussa and Rosen (1978) and choose parameters in such a way that the
monopolist prefers to oer a single quality in the absence of piracy. The question is
whether the introduction of copies (which are assumed to have the same quality as
originals) drives the monopolist to oer a second quality. In their model, consumers
are heterogeneous in two respects. First, as in the Mussa-Rosen setting, consumers
dier by their taste  for quality increases. Second, they also dier in their repro-
duction cost. The authors assume a positive correlation between the two sources
of heterogeneity: Consumers with a high preference for quality (high values of )
sustain a high copying cost cH; consumers with a low preference for quality (low
values of ) sustain a low copying cost cL. Under these assumptions, a high quality
product can be oered at a higher price to consumers with a high preference for
quality. The authors then show that the monopolist's optimal response to piracy
may be to introduce an extra version of lower quality. This lower quality version is
targeted at consumers with a low copying cost (and a low preference for quality);
its purpose is clearly to divert them from the pirated good to the original one. The
authors also show that a stricter enforcement of copyright protection reduces the
incentive to dierentiate, which reinforces the idea that vertical dierentiation is a
reaction to piracy.
Cho and Ahn (2010) study a related, though slightly dierent, issue. In their
setting, the monopolist optimally oers two qualities in the absence of piracy. What
they study, then, is how piracy aects the choice of these two qualities. Like
Alvisi et al., they adopt a Mussa-Rosen setting and assume that copies have the
same quality as originals. They make, however, dierent assumptions regarding
consumers: Instead of a continuum of consumer types, they assume two classes;
moreover, they assume that all consumers share the same copying cost. In this
framework, they show that the presence of piracy induces the rm to choose a lower
level of quality for the high-end version, and a higher level of quality for the low-end
version relative to decisions made in the absence of piracy (i.e., the rm reduces
vertical dierentiation under piracy). These results need to be put in perspective
with the results drawn from the basic models that we reviewed above. Novos and
Waldman (1984) and others show that piracy causes an underprovision problem as
it induces rms to create digital products with an inecient low quality. They also
suggest that strengthening copyright protection may alleviate this problem. Cho
17For a overview of versioning of information goods, see Shapiro and Varian (1998) and Belle-
amme (2006).
18The argument is similar to the decision by a monopolist to introduce a low-quality variant
in response to the introduction of a generic drug in the pharmaceutical industry (see Valletti and
Szymanski, 2006). More generally, recent work has considered conditions under which it is prot-
maximizing for a monopolist to introduce a low-quality variant (see e.g. Johnson and Myatt,
2003). In our piracy context, the argument also relates to King and Lampe (2003), as described
in the subsection on network eects below. In addition, a number of articles have looked at the
incentives to provide downgraded goods without piracy but with network eects. These include
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and Ahn's contribution is to show that when several versions of the same digital
product are oered, the underprovision problem only carries over to the high-quality
version. These results need to be kept in mind when disucssing the optimal level
of copyright protection.
3.2. A more favorable view of piracy. We now move beyond the previous basic
models and consider a number of reasons why copyright owners' prots may actually
increase with piracy. Piracy could then improve welfare not only in the short run
but also in the long run. We consider three reasons: Sampling, network eects, and
indirect appropriation.
3.2.1. Consumer sampling. As we have just seen, the basic models of end-user
piracy focus on an important feature of digital products, namely their public good
nature. The non-excludability of digital products is synonymous with the potential
for piracy, leading to appropriability problems for the producers. This section
addresses another important feature of digital products. Digital products (music
and movies in particular) belong to the category of experience goods, for which the
quality or suitability can only be observed after purchase. This poses yet another
problem for producers of digital products who may nd it hard to start selling a
new product because consumers lack information about it. One obvious answer to
this problem is to allow consumers to try out the product (listen to an extract from
a song, watch the trailer of a movie, browse a book in a bookshop or on the web,
test a beta version of a video game or a software).
In terms of experimentation, the digitalization of content products comes as a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, it is more dangerous for producers to release
\samples" of a digital product as these can quickly be copied and shared, thereby
jeopardizing the sales of the \full" original product. On the other hand, in an
increasingly interconnected world, the sharing of digital copies also largely reduces
the producers' costs of transmitting information to the consumers. The information
contained in pirated copies may be about the product t to the consumer taste, or
about the product quality. In the former case, copies are a form of sample while
in the latter, they can solve an adverse selection problem. We consider these two
views in turn.19
The sampling eect. The idea that copies can benet the sales of an original prod-
uct through an exposure or sampling eect was already present in the `analog'
world; Liebowitz (1985) made indeed this point for photocopies of books or jour-
nals. Digital technologies have naturally revived this idea as they make copying
and spreading digital products much less costly. This has lead a number of authors
to analyze the informational role of unauthorized copies on the copyright holders'
prots and strategies, as well as on welfare.
One path to model the informational role of digital copies is to extend the basic
single-product models that we reviewed above. Recall the vertical dierentiation
model used by Yoon (2002), Belleamme (2003) and Bae and Choi (2006). In this
19In a dierent, though related, approach, Wang and Zhang (2009) consider samples of digital
products that, unlike pirated versions, cannot be used as substitutes to the original product.
Hence, samples do not jeopardize the sales of the legitimate product. However, digitalization
prevents the rm from controlling free samples, as could be done with physical goods. It is,
therefore, impossible to target a particular category of consumers with samples (as samples become
immediately accessible to anyone once they are provided). The authors show that the rm may
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model, a consumer with taste parameter  derives utility q p from the original and
q c from the copy (where 1  measures the quality degradation and c, the cost
of acquiring or making a copy). In this framework, Ahn and Yoon (2009) assume
that digitalization and sampling aect a consumer's utility in the following way:
The utility from an original becomes (1 + s) p, where s > 0 denotes the sampling
eect of an original; the utility from a copy becomes (1 + t)0   c0, where t > 0
denotes the sampling eect of a copy, and 0 and c0 are the new quality degradation
parameter and consumers' reproduction cost, respectively. Typically, digitalization
contributes to reduce both the quality degradation and the reproduction cost of
copies; we expect thus 0 >  and c0 < c. The authors then carry out comparative
statics exercices to evaluate the impact of digitalization and sampling on prot,
consumer surplus and (short-run) social welfare. As far as prots are concerned,
Ahn and Yoon conrm that the positive informational eect of copies attenuates
their negative business-stealing eect. Unsurprisingly, the impact of digitalization
on the consumer surplus is unambiguously positive. Finally, they nd that the
impact on social welfare is ambiguous in general, but they show that the impact
may be positive.
Gopal, Bhattacharjee, and Sanders (2006) also examine the eects of sampling
in a single-product model with an exogenous price. In their setting, downloading
(of illegitimate les) may increase the attractiveness of the original product by
helping consumers nd out that they like the product. This sampling eect can be
decisive for consumers with intermediate valuations for the product. The authors
show indeed that these consumers buy the original if downloading is available, but
otherwise refrain from doing so. This allows the rm to increase its prots.20 The
authors further show that sampling, by reducing consumer uncertainty, is likely to
benet more producers of niche products rather than `superstars'.21
The informational role of digital copies available on P2P networks is further
analyzed in Duchene and Waelbroeck (2005, 2006), with the same basic model
of end-user piracy as a starting point (a single rm, an original providing addi-
tional value compared to the copy, and heterogeneous consumers with respect to
the opportunity cost of spending time online searching for les). Here, the rm's
distribution and protection strategies are explicitely taken into account and the
focus is on the eects of extended copyright protection. The authors assume that
consumers can purchase a new product only after they have downloaded a digital
copy that provides information on the characteristics of the product. They also as-
sume that technological protection increases the consumers' disutility of a copy but
at the same reduces the fair use value of the original product (although the former
eect is assumed to dominate the latter; the fair use value is due to information
20A similar situation is described by Chellappa and Shivendu (2005) in a two-stage model in
which consumers can use pirated copies to update their perception of a digital product's t to their
tastes. The rm's prots may increase if some pirates who, on the basis of their initial perception,
did not consider purchasing eventually decide, on the basis of their updated perception, to discard
the pirated version and purchase the original.
21Zhang (2002) also makes this point in a dierent setting. In a similar vein, Alcala and
Gonzalez-Maestre (2010) show that piracy reduces superstars' earnings and the incentives to
invest in their promotion, which tends to increase the market share and the number of niche and
young artists. The view that digital information transmission has reduced the skewness in the
distribution of content products|i.e., that niche products have found a larger audience, has been
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transmission through downloading. As for legal protection, it aects copiers' utility
through the expected penalty if caught copying. In this framework, Duchene and
Waelbroeck show that a stronger IP protection negatively aects both copiers and
buyers: The eect on copiers is direct through the increased expected penalty; the
eect on buyers is indirect and stems from the fact that a stronger legal protection
leads the rm to increase both its technological protection and its price, which
unambiguously reduces consumer surplus.
In contrast with the above papers, it is in a multi-product environment that Peitz
and Waelbroeck (2004, 2006a) analyze the informational role of copies and their
possibly positive eect on prots. They propose a multi-product monopoly model
in which products are located on the Salop circle and in which consumers regard
each original as superior to its copy. To model sampling, the authors assume that
if consumers are not able to download copies on P2P networks, they completely
lack information about the products and choose therefore at random among them.
In contrast, if copies are available, consumers can use them to obtain information
on the horizontal characteristics of products. That is, P2P allows users to sample
and, thereby, to obtain a very precise signal concerning the location of the products
with respect to their own taste.22 As the number of products increases and as they
become more dierentiated, this sampling eect becomes more powerful; consumers
have then a higher willingness to pay for the original and, as Peitz and Waelbroeck
show, the rm eventually benets from the availability of digital copies.
Copying and adverse selection. In situations of asymmetric information, copies can
provide information on the quality of the original product and, thereby, they have
the potential to solve an adverse selection problem. This is the argument developed
by Takeyama (2003). In her model, a monopolist sells, over two periods, a durable
digital product that can have two exogenous qualities (high and low). There is
asymmetric information insofar as quality is known to the producer but not to the
consumers. It is assumed that consumers have no value for low quality, have unit
demand and are present in both periods. This benchmark setting is designed in
such a way that the adverse selection problem prevents a high-quality rm from
making prots.
However, the situation may be improved in the presence of piracy. A consumer
who copies in the rst period will indeed learn the quality of the product and may
then decide to purchase the original in the second period (as it is assumed that the
original provides a higher value to consumers than the copy). Using our previous
notation, we can write the utility from a copy as iq   c. As before, c denotes
the reproduction cost. As for the quality degradation parameter, it is assumed that
it can take two values: One group of consumers receive a low value from copies
(L) and the other group, a higher value (H > L). Takeyama imposes some
parameter restrictions to make sure that the group of consumers with parameter
L never copy; for these `captive consumers', the reproduction cost is higher than
the benets of the copy, whatever the true quality and the price of the original. In
contrast, the other group may decide to copy in the rst period and, upon learning
that the product is of high quality, purchase in the second.
22The mirror image of such information pull is the information push strategy of a producer
to reveal relevant product characteristics to consumers. Such a strategy may consist of content
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Dierent types of equilibria are possible in which the presence of copies allows
a high-quality rm to make prots. A rst possibility is a pooling equilibrium
in which the rm intertemporally price-discriminates. In the rst period, the rm
sells to captive consumers and lets the group with a high value for copies copy;
in the second period, the rm sells to the latter group at a price equal to the
value that they attach to the quality dierential between the two versions (i.e.,
(1   H)q). Copying solves the adverse selection problem for high quality by
bringing an informational gain that the high-quality rm can capture.
There also exists a separating equilibrium with copies in which the quality may
be revealed to consumers prior to purchase and the low quality original may not
be available on the market. A natural extension of this result is to let the rm
decide whether copies should be available or not (by enforcing copyright or not).
Takeyama (2003) shows that the rm may strategically decide to make copies avail-
able (i.e., not to enforce copyright) as the existence of copies serves as a signal of
high quality. Takeyama (2009) explores more deeply this idea that a producer of
digital products can signal product quality via its copyright enforcement decision.
To this end, she explicitly models copyright enforcement and allows it to be partial
(instead of the all-or-nothing assumption of the previous model). In this extended
model, she shows that a high-quality rm may be able to choose a level of partial
copyright protection that a low-quality rm would never nd protable to mimic.
There exists therefore a separating equilibrium in which high quality is revealed.23
Note that if there was perfect information, a high-quality rm would opt for full
copyright protection. We see thus here that asymmetric information may make
partial enforcement of IP protection (i.e., some tolerance of piracy) protable for
copyright holders.
Summary. Digital goods are complex experience goods: Consumers face uncertainty
whether a particular variety exists, and they have heterogeneous tastes for them.
Sampling by consumers can be highly benecial for such goods. Information-pull
technologies, such as P2P networks, social networks and other Web 2.0 technologies,
greatly facilitate such sampling, especially for new or niche rms (and artists). This
suggests that sampling has the potential to generate positive welfare eects both
in the short and in the long run. This also explains why business models based on
traditional information-push technologies are slowly making way, under the pressure
of end-user piracy, to new business models and industry structures (see Section ??
for a brief review).
3.2.2. Network eects. A large majority of digital products exhibit network eects
in the sense that they give a utility to their users that increases with the number of
other users of that product. Hence, the utility derived from consumption depends
directly or indirectly on the consumption decision of other consumers. Software is
the prime illustration: The usefulness of a software often directly increases with the
number of users because (in case of incompatibility or only partial compatibility
with other products) a user can more easily exchange les generated with that
software; also, it often indirectly increases with the number of users because more
complementary products and services are oered (due to increasing returns). Music,
books and movies also exhibit network eects: The more they are consumed, the
23As a deliberate low enforcement of copyright protection is analogous to charging a low
introductory price of zero (or of distributing free samples), we notice a clear parallel between
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more people are knowledgeable about them and the more they become attractive
(because of word-of-mouth recommendation, or because of the social prestige they
confer).24
When it comes to piracy, the key point is that network eects are generated by
both legitimate and pirated copies of a particular product. That is, pirated copies
contribute, through network eects, to raise the attractiveness of the original prod-
uct. It follows that not enforcing copyright protection may, in some market envi-
ronments, be privately and socially benecial in the presence of network eects.25
This point was rst made by Conner and Rumelt (1991). A number of other stud-
ies have developed the argument in a monopoly setting (we defer duopoly settings
to the next section). In contrast with the basic analyses of end-user piracy, these
papers reject the idea that piracy necessarily reduces the monopolist's prots.
As we did for sampling, we start by extending the basic model to allow for
network eects. Belleamme (2003) does so in the following way. Recall that in the
basic model, utilities were q p and q c for an original and a copy respectively.
Now, with network eects, these utilities become ( + N)q p and ( + N)q 
c, where N is the consumer mass with an original or a copy, and  measures
the strength of the network eect. Repeating the analysis of the monopolist's
optimal pricing decision under these new assumptions, Belleamme shows that
piracy continues to reduce prots as long as network eects are not too strong.
Contrastingly, Takeyama (1994) shows, in a dierent model, that piracy can
benet the monopolist. Like Belleamme (2003), she assumes that users only re-
ceive a share  of the utility associated with the original when using an illegal
copy. Her assumptions about consumers and network eects, however, dier with
Belleamme's. First, instead of considering a continuum of user types, she takes
a two-type distribution: There is a group of high-valuation users and a group of
low-valuation users. Second, while Belleamme assumes that only the xed util-
ity depends on the network size, she assumes that it is the type-dependent utility
that depends on the network size. It follows that under Takeyama's specication,
the network eect is more pronounced for the original than for the copy. This is
best seen by looking at consumers' utilities. Supposing that N users consume the
product (in either form), high-valuation users derive utilities N   p and N   c,
respectively from an original and a copy. As for low-valuation users, these utilities
are "N   p and "N   c, with 0 < " < 1.
Let us now sketch Takeyama's main result in a simple example where we set the
reproduction cost c to zero and where we assume that each group of users is of
mass 1. When copies are not available (because, e.g., copyright protection is fully
enforced), a monopolist who sets a uniform price faces the following alternative:
It sets either p = 2" if all users are served, or p = 1 if only high-valuation users
are served. The former option yields a prot of 4" and the latter, a prot of 1.
Hence, the rm chooses to serve all users if " > 1=4, and only high-valuation users
24Akin to network eects are addiction eects that create a positive inter-temporal link be-
tween a consumer's own consumption of a digital product. Silva and Ramello (2000) note that
low-valuation consumers can become high-valuation ones thanks to previous consumption. As
Regner et al. (2009) observe, a kind of sampling eect may then arise insofar as current consump-
tion of a copy can lead to future purchases of the same product or artist when consuming the
copy has created sucient pleasure over time.
25In this section, we focus on the eects on the rm's prot and only make a few remarks on
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otherwise. Suppose now that piracy is an option (which all users prefer to not
consuming as copies are free). If the rm targets only high-valuation users, the
maximal price it can charge is 2(1   ), as a mass 2 of users consume the product
and as (1   ) is the additional value attached to an original with respect to a copy.
The associated prot is 2(1   ). On the other hand, if the rm wants to sell to
all users, the maximum price is 2(1   )" and the associated prot, 4(1   )".
It is thus optimal to serve only high-valuation users if 2(1   ) > 4(1   )" or
" < 1=2. It follows that for 1=4 < " < 1=2, piracy leads the monopolist to switch
tactics: It serves all users whitout piracy but only high-valuation users with piracy.
And if the monopolist can choose between the two regimes, it prefers not to enforce
copyright protection if 2(1   ) > 4"|i.e., if the original is suciently superior to
the pirated version.
To summarize, we have that under certain conditions, the rm prefers to set a low
price when piracy is not possible so as to sell to all users and fully exploit network
eects. However, when piracy is possible, the rm can benet from full network
eects while, at the same time, setting a high price to target high-valuation users.
As low-valuation users generate network eects even when they copy instead of
purchasing the original, the rm foregoes less prot from not serving this group
of users when piracy is present. There exist thus parameter congurations for
which prots without enforcement are higher than prots with full enforcement of
copyright protection.26
Gayer and Shy (2003a) obtain similar results. They consider a monopoly model
in which original and copy are horizontally dierentiated and in which the original
may give higher xed utility and stronger network eects. The authors show that
if network eects for the original are suciently strong, the monopolist's prots are
larger with the availability of copies.
It must be noted that the previous results might not carry over to situations
where the monopolist uses versioning strategies. In particular, King and Lampe
(2003) show that a monopolist who oers a downgraded version himself (in order
to exploit network eects) may suer from end-user piracy. The reason is that it is
often optimal to sell the downgraded version at a low but positive price. It is only
if creating a low-end version is suciently costly for the monopolist that it is not
in its interest to use this strategy.
Summary. When network eects are taken into account, one observes that copyright
holders may welcome end-user piracy. This is likely to be the case if rms manage
to price discriminate between users of originals and copiers (and if they do not
have any superior discrimination strategies available). The policy implication is
that weak IP protection should be favored because it makes both consumers and
rms better o in the short run (and it also fosters incentives to create or improve
quality in the long run).
3.2.3. Indirect appropriation. Indirect appropriation refers to the idea that the abil-
ity to make copies may increase the consumers' willingness to pay for originals and,
thereby, allow producers of originals to capture (partially or even fully) the value
of these copies. This idea has been put forward by Liebowitz (1985) in the case
of photocopies of books and other printed material. The argument is in fact an
26Takeyama (1994) also shows that piracy can lead to a Pareto improvement compared to the
setting in which copies are not available. This occurs when the monopolist only sells to high-
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application of (third-degree) price discrimination. Groups of consumers dier by
their willingness to pay for the original product and the source of the dierence is
the value that they attach to the ability of copying. Thus, if the producer is able
to identify those consumers who purchase the originals that serve as models for
subsequent copies, he can increase his prots by charging a higher price to these
consumers than to other consumers. The dierence between the prices for the two
groups is nothing but the value of copies; it is thus as if the producer had been able
to charge directly the consumers of copies.
It is important to note that this result relies on three restrictive assumptions:
(i) It must be possible for the producer to assess the amount of copying that will
be done from a single original; (ii) the population of buyers of the original must be
homogeneous; (iii) as in any price dsicrimination story, arbitrage must be prevented.
Liebowitz argues that these assumptions are largely satised for the particular case
of photocopying of academic journals. Libraries may indeed be expected to copy
more and they are easily identied. The theory is appealing as it can be invoked
to explain the shift from books (weak complement with photocopiers) to journals
(strong complements) in the academic profession.27
Liebowitz's paper has been very inuential and has inspired a number of sub-
sequent studies on the issue of indirect appropriability. Besen and Kirby (1989)
make a link between indirect appropriability and the issue of a monopolist facing
a second-hand market. In a model with small-scale copying, they show that direct
appropriability arises when the marginal cost of copying is constant and indirect
appropriability when the marginal cost is increasing in the number of copies. The
main message of their analysis is thus that the technology of copying and the sub-
stitutability between originals and their copies are crucial to assess the advantage of
direct versus indirect appropriation. Besen and Kirby also show that strong substi-
tutability between originals and copies, combined with increasing marginal cost of
copying, lead to a situation of clubs who share the cost of the original among their
(copying) members. The notion of sharing copies within clubs has been further
analyzed by Bakos, Brynjolfsson, and Lichtman (1999) and by Varian (2000). The
issue is to determine under which conditions selling to clubs rather than to their
members directly is more protable for the copyright owner.
The next question that arises naturally is whether indirect appropriation is ap-
plicable to any copying environment. Serious doubts can be raised when looking
at how digital technologies have increased the speed and quality with which copies
can be made and distributed. As Watt (2005) nicely puts it, \indirect appropriabil-
ity has been shown to work well enough for the very special case of publishing of
academic journals, but surely it would take a rather bold man indeed to seriously
suggest that it can also provide a robust form of remuneration for copyright holders
when music is burned from one CD to another, when mp3 les are shared by 50
million individual Internet users from their own homes world wide, and when boot-
legged copies of Microsoft Oce 2003 show up on the back streets of Bangkok."
27Liebowitz tests for indirect appropriability by analyzing the change in the relative price of
an economic journal charged to institutions and individuals between 1959 and 1982 as a function
of its usage (measured by citations). After controlling for journal age and commercial journals,
Liebowitz nds a positive relation between the usage and the relative price of copyrighted good.
Also, price discrimination increased after the introduction of photocopy machines and demand
for material that is easy to copy (such as journal articles) increased compared to other materials
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Johnson and Waldman (2005) share Watt's skepticism about the wider applicability
of indirect appropriation. They identify two reasons why the indirect appropriation
argument can break down in markets for digital products. First, if copies ood the
market, their price falls to marginal cost, which is essentially zero for digital prod-
ucts. It follows that there is no prot associated with selling copies and thus no
indirect appropriability component of the price of original. Second, as digital copies
are close substitutes for originals, the price at which copies are available limits the
price the monopolist can charge for originals. Moreover, this price is necessarily
low if consumer valuation for copies is low. For these two reasons, the ability of
indirect appropriation does not seem to oer an escape route by which copyright
holders could benet from end-user piracy in digital markets.
Note that Johnson and Waldman's arguments apply more to the initial argument
of Liebowitz (1985) and Besen and Kirby (1989) than to the sharing version of Bakos
et al. (1999) and Varian (2000). However, one can also be skeptical about the
applicability of the sharing argument to digital products. Indeed, as the marginal
production costs of digital products are negligible, it cannot be protable to sell
them through clubs. It can be argued, however, that the denition of costs should
be broadened to include marketing and distribution costs, which may well be non-
negligible even in a digital world. In this case, private copying (done within clubs)
may enhance the copyright holder's prot. This may explain, for example, the
practice of site licenses for software. When these marketing and distribution costs
are due to an asymmetric information problem between rm and consumers, the
sampling argument that we exposed above complements the explanation.
A more convincing case can be made for indirect appropriation in digital markets
if one considers that indirect appropriation does not apply across consumers for a
given digital product but across complementary goods for a given consumer. The
idea is simple: If illegal copies are consumed together with private goods that
cannot be copied, the potential problem of end-user copying for copyright owners
is much less pronounced. We briey return to this argument in Section ?? where
we describe new business models designed to tackle end-user piracy.
Summary. Indirect appropriation works when it is possible to assess the value of
the uses made from a legally purchased product. Producers can indirectly appro-
priate revenues from homogenous consumers who share its products within a club
or community if the marginal cost of copying is increasing. Digital technologies,
however, seriously undermine the feasibility of this strategy as high-quality copies
can quickly ood the market.
4. End-user piracy and market structure
So far in this survey, we have considered environments where a single digital prod-
uct is oered by a monopoly producer.28 It may be argued that a single-product
monopoly setting is a reasonable approximation for markets with a high degree
of horizontal product dierentiation (like music, books or movies). There exist,
however, a number of situations where this assumption proves restrictive and inap-
propriate. Even if digital products are highly dierentiated and, therefore, hardly
28There are two exceptions in the papers we have reviewed in the previous sections: First,
Johnson (1985) studies a monopolistic competition framework in which a number of copyright
holders produce each a single original; second, Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004, 2006a) consider a
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compete directly with one another, some form of indirect competition may never-
theless appear. First, indirect competition stems either from the presence of a com-
mon substitute (namely copying) to otherwise independent originals, or, secondly,
from the durability of the digital product that puts the monopolist in competi-
tion with its future selves. Thirdly, some digital products present higher levels of
substitutability, at least on some market segments; think, e.g., of business software
that oer similar functionalities and are, therefore, close substitutes.29 We examine
these three situations in turn.
4.1. Indirect competition caused by copying. Related to Johnson (1985), the
idea that copying generates a form of indirect competition between horizontally dif-
ferentiated digital products has been studied by Belleamme and Picard (2007). In
a multi-product framework, they show how increasing returns to scale in the copy-
ing technology create an interdependence between the demands for digital products,
which would be independent otherwise. Increasing returns to scale in copying typi-
cally arise if consumers incur a high initial xed cost to be able to copy (for example
by breaking the `moral barrier' to illegal copying or by purchasing a DVD burner).
It follows that a rm benets from low prices of the other rms because this makes
consumers less prone to install the copying technology, thereby reducing the threat
of piracy. As a result, there exists in this setting a range of prices for which prices
are strategic substitutes.
In a two-product duopoly, Belleamme and Picard show that this strategic sub-
stitutability generates free-riding behaviors with respect to the threat of piracy: If
the two rms take this threat seriously by quoting low prices, then there exists an
opportunity for a rm to take advantage of this situation and to raise its price. If
the xed cost of copying is low enough, such free-riding can lead to the absence
of an equilibrium in pure strategies. Firms may then randomize between several
prices, leading to price dispersion.30 Interestingly, when the xed cost of copying
is not too small, the market can yield a symmetric equilibrium with prices that
are larger than the (average) price that would be set by a multi-product monopoly
controlling the two digital products.31
The interactions between copyright holders under the threat of piracy also yield
surprising welfare implications. From a static eciency perspective, concentration
may be preferable to competition; this result is an application of the `Cournot eect'
according to which a merger between two monopolies producing complementary
goods is welfare-enhancing. Regarding dynamic eciency, the multi-product setting
makes it possible to assess the incentives to create new digital products (rather
than the incentives to improve the quality of existing products, as is done in the
literature using monopoly settings). To this end, Belleamme and Picard measure
29Even in the music and lm industries, it can be argued that production and pricing decisions
are concentrated in the hands of a small number of major players.
30Price dispersion is commonly observed in markets for digital products. For instance, Bryn-
jolfsson and Smith (2000) observe prices for a matched set of 20 books and 20 CDs sold through
conventional and Internet outlets, and report average price dierences ranging from 25% for books
to 33% for CDs. The explanation usually advanced in the literature does not rely on piracy, though,
but on asymmetric information and search frictions (see, e.g.,Varian, 1980 and Baye and Morgan,
2001).
31Belleamme and Picard even show that there exist parameter congurations for which the
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the (gross) incentives to create a new digital product by comparing their two-
product framework with an economy where only a single digital product is available.
Whether those incentives are larger for an entrant or for an incumbent rm is not
clear a priori. On the one hand, the entrant's incentives are reduced by the free-
riding eect observed in a duopoly; on the other hand, the incumbent's incentives
are reduced by a cannibalization eect (copying becomes more attractive as the
number of goods increases). Yet, it is possible to conclude in this model that
incentives to create are always higher for an entrant|i.e., if the ex post economy is
organized as a duopoly. Therefore, ex post competition can be seen as a necessary
evil that enhances ex ante incentives to create (which is the exact opposite of the
traditional argument underlying IP protection, as recalled in Section ??).
Clearly, the previous results are derived from a set of restrictive assumptions and
should, therefore, not be taken at face value. They suggest, however, that under the
threat of piracy, copyright holders impose on each other a number of externalities
that may signicantly alter the equilibrium outcome (and the welfare implications)
compared to what is obtained under a one-good monopoly setting.
4.2. Durable goods and commitment problem. Digital products such as soft-
ware are durable goods|i.e., consumers can benet from the purchase of these
goods over a number of periods. An important issue for rms selling durable goods
is whether they can commit to future prices. In the absence of commitment, a
monopolist selling a durable good is, in eect, in price competition with itself over
several periods, which might force it, at the extreme, to oer a competitive price in
the rst period|this is the Coase conjecture that has been formalized by Stokey
(1981), Bulow (1982), Gul, Sonnenschein (1986).32
Re-considering end-user piracy, Takeyama (1997) assumes that a copyright holder
suers from this Coasian commitment problem and shows that piracy may hurt the
monopolist even more when dynamic eects are taken into account.33 She develops
a two-period model with two types of consumers, who buy up to one unit in the
two periods: `High types' have a high valuation for the good and no propensity to
copy, while `low types' have a low valuation for the good and a strong propensity
to copy. Without copying, high types anticipate a lower price in the second pe-
riod, which is set to make low types indierent between buying and not buying.
Therefore, the monopolist has to oer a price strictly below the valuation of high
types in the rst period so as to satisfy their incentive constraint. The problem gets
32In many markets for digital products, it is not clear whether rms actually lack commitment
power. Indeed, since most rms oer multiple products, they may not give steep mark-downs over
time for reputation reasons. As is well-known in the literature on the durable goods monopoly,
reputation concerns may give the rm commitment power. Planned obsolescence, which is common
for software, may also be used to reduce the durability of the product.
33In related papers on versioning by a durable goods monopolist, Hahn (2006) and Inderst
(2008) consider an environment with two consumer types and discrete time in which a rm can
sell dierent versions of a product over time. Here, the rm faces a commitment problem in price
and quality. They show that a rm may optimally decide to sell a low- and a high-quality version
in the rst period (and trade only occurs in this period). The rm may optimally sell the low-
quality version below marginal cost in the rst period. By serving low-valuation consumers in the
rst period, it avoids price concessions in later periods to high-valuation consumers. This result
can be interpreted in terms of piracy as follows: illegal copying (which resembles a low-quality
version) may mitigate the Coasian commitment problem so that copies that are distributed for
free actually increase the rm's prot. Hahn (2006) also provides detailed conditions for the
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worse when copying is possible: Now, the monopolist has to lower the second-period
price to make low types indierent between buying and copying. This leads to a
reduction in prots that is equivalent to what would be obtained in an atemporal
model. However, what makes things worse is that the lower second-period price
aects the incentive constraint of high types in such a way that the monopolist also
has to lower the rst-period price. This second, dynamic, eect leads to a further
reduction in rst-period prots.
It is thus shown that the dynamic problem typically amplies the negative eect
of piracy on prots. However, Takeyama also identies cases where copying actually
increases prots: If the monopolist cannot avoid copying in the second period with-
out making losses in that period (i.e., if the marginal costs of production and selling
of the good are above the private copying cost of low types), then the availability
of copies in the second period serves as a commitment not to oer the good in the
second period. As a consequence, in the rst period, the participation constraint
and not the incentive constraint of high types becomes binding. In other words,
the monopolist can extract the full surplus from high types.
4.3. Competitive eects. What happens when two producers of substitutable
and piratable digital products directly compete with each another? Shy and Thisse
(1999) address this issue by extending to a duopoly framework the analysis of piracy
in the presence of network eects (in the spirit of Conner and Rumelt, 1991, and
Takeyama, 1994). In their model, two rms are located at the extreme points of the
Hotelling line. Two types of consumers are distributed along the line: Using the
same terminology as in the previous model, `high types' have a strong preference
for originals, while `low types' are indierent whether the good is an original or a
copy. In particular, the benet from purchasing the original is r > 0 for high types
and 0 for low types.34 Both types of consumers enjoy network benets, which are
generated by the total number of users of a particular software (be they consumers
of the original or of a copy). Denoting this number by N and considering the
product located at 0, we have the following utility functions for a consumer located
at x 2 [0;1]: When purchasing the original, the consumer gets r + N   x   p
if her type is high and N   x   p if her type is low; when copying the product,
the consumer gets N   x whatever her type ( measures the strength of network
eects and copies are assumed to be free and to be prefect substitutes to originals).
Shy and Thisse impose parameter restrictions to make sure that the rms never
compete for low types. Under this assumption, they compare the types of equilibria
that obtain when (full) copy protection prevails or when consumers can copy. Under
copy protection, they show that there exist up to two types of symmetric equilibria:
If network eects are suciently strong, the equilibrium is such that both rms price
low so as to sell the good to some low types; if network eects are suciently weak,
the rms prefer at equilibrium to set prices so as to sell only to high types.35 In
contrast, when consumers can copy, the argument already put forward by Takeyama
(1994) may apply: Firms can exploit network eects without selling to low value
consumers. This is true as long as network eects are strong enough. Then, rms do
not need to price low to take advantage of network eects (as they had to under copy
34The dierence in value between an original and a copy is thus independent of the network
eect, contrary to Takeyama (1994).
35For this result, see Peitz (2004) who corrects a mistake made by Shy and Thisse in their
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protection). When copies are freely available, they can concentrate on high value
consumers and still reap the benets from network eects, which leads to higher
prices and prots. On the other hand, when network eects are weak, it turns out
that sales are not aected by the copy protection policy. What changes, however,
in a duopoly framework is that price competition gets ercer and, consequently,
prots fall.
The analysis of Shy and Thisse (1999) has been extended in a number of di-
rections. Jain (2008) renes the analysis of copyright protection by assuming that
rm i can choose a level of copyright protection, noted i, such that only a pro-
portion i of low types (who are, by assumption, the only consumers interested in
copying) can copy its product (that is, i represents the level of piracy for rm i's
product). Another important dierence with Shy and Thisse's framework is that
Jain lifts the restriction on the absence of competition for low types. Jain assumes
instead that low types have a suciently higher valuation for the product such that
rms compete for them. It turns out that results change signicantly under this
alternative assumption. In the absence of network eects, Jain shows that piracy
can change the composition of the market and, thereby, reduce price competition
between rms. This is because copying by low types, who are more price-sensitive,
enables rms to credibly charge higher prices on the segment of consumers that do
not copy. Furthermore, this positive eect of piracy on rms' prots can sometimes
outweigh the negative impact due to lost sales. So, even in the absence of network
eects, rms may prefer weak copyright protection in equilibrium. The existence of
network eects, however, somewhat blurs the picture. Actually, the opposite result
may hold when network eects are strong enough: It is copyright enforcement that
helps rms to reduce price competition. This is because when rms compete for low
types and network eects are strong, allowing piracy by both rms can intensify
price competition. Therefore, in such situations, strict copyright enforcement by
one rm can serve as a coordination device to reduce price competition. The main
message that can then be drawn from Jain's analysis is that, in a duopoly frame-
work, the role of copyright protection depends on the strength of network eects:
Absent network eects, weak copyright protection allows rms to increase prices,
while the opposite prevails in the case of strong network eects.
Minnitti and Vergari (2010) also consider a dierentiated-product duopoly frame-
work. Their goal is to analyse how the presence of a (private, small-scale) le-
sharing community aects the pricing behaviour and protability of producers of
digital products. It is assumed that consumers can download one of the two goods
by joining a le-sharing community, with the restriction that consumers can join
only if they buy and share a digital good with the community.36 Their model dif-
fers from the above two models in a number of ways. First, consumers are assumed
to be homogeneous (except for their location on the Hotelling line); they all value
originals in the same way but their copying cost depends on their location. Second,
there are no network eects. Third, consumers are allowed to consume both goods:
They may buy one and copy the other.37 Finally, the intrinsic benet from using
the rst digital product may not be large enough for all consumers to be willing to
participate. Minnitti and Vergari show that the latter assumption is key: Market
36This initial purchase requirement seems a reasonable assumption within small, private com-
munities where consumers share only the les they own.
37As long as piracy is feasible, purchasing both goods is a dominated option for all consumers.22 PAUL BELLEFLAMME AND MARTIN PEITZ
coverage is indeed crucial in determining rms' attitude towards piracy. In partic-
ular, when the market is not completely covered, rms are shown to benet from
piracy. We are indeed in the presence of two monopolies that see the downloading
option as a way to enlarge their market share without increasing competition. This
is because downloading is made through le-sharing communities that can only be
joined by consumers who have purchased a digital product. Hence, the downloading
possibility makes the goods more attractive, which drives some consumers to use
both goods. Firms take thus advantage of a form of indirect appropriation. Natu-
rally, this argument only holds when there are consumers still to be conquered. In
fully covered markets, the positive demand eect is indeed missing and le-sharing
is harmful to rms; they would therefore prefer to be protected from piracy.
5. Commercial digital piracy
We have been concerned so far with end-user piracy. In this section, we consider
briey commercial (or for-prot) piracy|i.e., piracy achieved by organizations that
illegally reproduce and sell copyrighted products at a large scale. Commercial
piracy is a form of counterfeiting, which, following Grossman and Shapiro (1988a,
1988b), can be dened as illegally copying authentic goods with a brand name.
It can take one of two forms: Either the copied product is a perfect substitute
of the original one and, insofar as the two products are sold at the same price
(which is usually the case), consumers cannot distinguish between them; or the
counterfeited product is an imperfect substitute of the original one and consumers
knowingly make a choice regarding which product to buy.38 These two forms are
called, respectively, `deceptive' and `non-deceptive' counterfeiting in Grossman and
Shapiro's terminology.
Although commercial piracy is a major concern to the producers of digital prod-
ucts (software, music and movies), mainly in developing countries,39 this form of
piracy has received little attention in the economics literature. There is in fact only
a handful of papers that explicitly study commercial piracy. However, commercial
piracy can largely be studied by using the models developped in the literature on
end-user piracy. As far as consumer decisions are concerned, nothing really diers
between the two forms of piracy: Copying from a friend or buying a counterfeited
product are essentially modelled in the same way. Now, what clearly diers in the
case of commercial piracy is the presence of an additional category of (possibly
strategic) players, namely the counterfeiters. Yet, from a modelling point of view,
including these players is not fundamentally dierent from including competing
legitimate producers, as is done in the models reviewed in the previous section.
38Consumers know (or strongly suspect) that they are buying a counterfeit, either because
they observe the product's low quality after close inspection, or simply because of the place of
purchase. For instance, in the case of music, we can think of CDs bought from street peddlers,
or of downloads from a le-sharing service such as the Russian site AllofMP3, which charged
signicantly lower prices than those of mainstream services (although this site claimed that it
operated in accordance with Russian copyright law, it was closed down in 2006 under American
pressure).
39Estimates of the eects of piracy on the prots of copyright owners are notoriously hard
to make; distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial forms of piracy is fraught with
even more diculties. Kiema (2008, p. 304-305) reports that \the International Federation of the
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) has estimated that approximately 37% of all the [music] CDs that
were purchased in 2005 globally were pirate copies. However, in the case of the software industry,
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Banerjee (2003, 2006) studies competition between an incumbent copyright owner
and one potential pirate entrant. Consumers are assumed to be able to distinguish
legitimate from pirate products, for which they have a lower willingness to pay|i.e.,
Banerjee considers non-deceptive counterfeiting. He uses the Mussa-Rosen model of
vertical product dierentiation, with consumers being heterogeneous with respect
to the utility derived from the quality dierence between the original and the copy.
The main dierence with the models reviewed in Subsection ?? is that the price of
the copy is set by a prot-maximizing counterfeiter. In this context, Banerjee ana-
lyzes what attitude a government (caring about static eciency) and the copyright
owner take in the face of piracy. The government may decide to monitor and pe-
nalize commercial piracy, while the copyright owner may combine entry-deterrence
strategies and investments in protective devices against copying.40 Jaisingh (2009)
performs a similar analysis in a slightly dierent framework: The heterogeneity
with respect to quality dierences is replaced by heterogeneity with respect to the
copying costs (which can be increased by anti-piracy measures). The analytical
reasons as to why the policy implications drawn from Jaisingh's and Banerjee's
analyses dier are clearly explained in Bae and Choi (2006).41
The above analyses share the often unrealistic assumption that only one coun-
terfeiter can enter the market. In reality, counterfeiters tend to remain relatively
small. As copying and distributing digital products do not require heavy invest-
ments, entry in the counterfeiting business is relatively easy and the number of
counterfeiters tends thus to be large on a given market. Being small also reduces
the risk for the pirate to be detected by a public authority. It is also observed
that pirated copies are priced above marginal cost (which is close to zero for digital
products). One needs then to address the question why Bertrand competition be-
tween the counterfeiters (rather than between them and the copyright owner) does
not drive prices down to zero.
Yao (2005) proposes the following answer: Although counterfeiters have zero
marginal cost of production, they face an expected cost resulting from the risk
of being caught by the authorities. In particular, counterfeiters are caught with
probability  2 [0;1], and have to pay a ne, which is xed at some proportion
t of the price of the legitimate product, pm. Letting pc denote the price of a
pirate copy, we have that the net expected payo due to counterfeiting is equal
to (1   )pc   tpm. Because of free entry and exit of counterfeiters, this should
be equal to zero at the long-run equilibrium. It follows that pc = (tpm)=(1   ),
which increases with pm, the price of the legitimate product and with , which can
be seen as the monitoring rate to detect counterfeits and thus, as an indicator of
the strength of IP rights enforcement.42
40Martinez-Sanchez (2010b) considers (movie) piracy in a vertical product dierentiation model
with sequential pricing and shows that the pirate, if it enters, decides to oer the illegal copy prior
to the release of the original. Maximizing short-run welfare the government does not fully protect
the copyright holder and, similar to the work on end-user piracy, the government designs its policy
such that the incumbent decides to set a price below the monopoly price that successfully deters
the pirate from entering the market.
41Banerjee et al. (2008) address the same questions in the case of deceptive counterfeiting
(originals and copies are seen as perfect substitutes by the consumers).
42Yao (2005) further assumes that the original product and the pirate copies are vertically
dierentiated  a la Mussa-Rosen (counterfeiting is thus non-deceptive). In this framework, he
analyzes the eect of changes in the extent of IP rights enforcement on total social welfare (dynamic
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Kiema (2008) proposes a related explanation for the positive price of pirate
copies. Counterfeiters are assumed to have zero marginal cost of production but
to face some positive `advertising cost'. To make positive sales, counterfeiters have
to inform consumers of the availability of their products; they do so, by sending
advertisements to consumers at random. Although the physical cost of sending an
ad is close to zero in a digital world, each additional sending increases the expected
cost of punishment for the counterfeiter, which makes the advertising cost positive.
As a result, the competition between the counterfeiters resembles the classical model
of advertising by Butters (1977), which leads to equilibrium price dispersion.43
6. Private and public measures against end-user piracy
In the preceding sections, we considered the rightholder's reaction to piracy and
mostly focused on the pricing decision, taking the enforcement policy and public
measures in the face of piracy as given. Public debate has been dominated by the
actions that should be taken, especially by the government, in response to piracy.
In this section, we report on some recent eorts on this issue. One can distinguish
three categories of actions: (1) legal actions; (2) technology-based actions and (3)
alternative remuneration schemes. Concerning the rst category, one may want to
distinguish between actions against platforms on which piracy is taking place|i.e.,
legal actions against le-sharing platforms such as the old Napster|and actions
against individual uploaders and downloaders. Concerning the second category, in
the context of digital les this comes under the name of digital rights management
(DRM). Concerning the third category, it is a bit odd to talk about piracy, since
levies on hardware intend to give returns to rightholders under a fair-use regime|
i.e., to justify levies end-user copying cannot be seen as illegal, but would need to
be considered fair use.
6.1. Legal actions.
6.1.1. Facts. It is fair to say that it is the introduction of Napster (a peer-to-peer{
P2P{le-sharing system) in 1999 that turned the issue of digital piracy into a topic
of intense debate. The fear was great in the music industry that illegal le-sharing
would quickly destroy prots. The rst legal actions were thus targeted against le-
sharing platforms. In 2001, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)
obtained the closure of Napster but the victory proved short-lived as a number
of other le-sharing systems (such as Kazaa, Limewire, and Morpheus) quickly
replaced Naspter. The industry started then a campaign of litigation against in-
dividual P2P le sharers: Between 2003 and 2008, legal proceedings were opened
against about 35,000 people. In parallel, the industry also lobbied to obtain stronger
protection of copyrights and stier penalties for infringement. Yet, these tactics did
not prove very eective in combating online music piracy. At the end of 2008, the
industry decided then to shift its eorts to a model known as `graduated response'.
is that the government should monitor counterfeiting only if the degree to which counterfeiters
are able to imitate the original product is above some threshold.
43Combining these assumptions with the usual Mussa-Rosen framework, Kiema (2008) ana-
lyzes the role of government policy and of DRM systems in preventing commercial piracy. One
interesting result is that when there are several counterfeiters on the market, an increase in the
price of legitimate copies increases price dispersion in the market for pirate copies and decreases
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As we already mentioned in Section ??, a widely publicized form of graduated re-
sponse (in Europe and in the United States) is a \three strikes" rule according to
which the user's ISP suspends or terminates Internet access after three successive
notices of copyright infringement. At the time of this writing, it is too early to
assess the eectiveness of such measures.
6.1.2. Analysis. In the basic analysis of the eects of digital piracy that we de-
scribed in Section ??, we already examined how stronger legal actions against
copyright infringement may aect the right holder's prot and the consumer sur-
plus. Recall that legal actions were modeled through either a marginal increase in
the copying cost or a marginal decrease in the quality of copies (see, e.g., Novos
and Waldman, 1984, Yoon, 2002, or Bae and Choi, 2006). We complete here this
preliminary analysis by reviewing a couple of papers that have a closer look at how
copyright protection is chosen.
In the analyses of Section ??, it was assumed that the copyright holder does
not distinguish between dierent types of users|i.e., we considered a broad-based
enforcement policy that aects all consumers in the same way. A copyright holder
may, however, prefer a targeted enforcement policy and focus instead on some spe-
cic user groups. In particular, the monopolist may want to concentrate on high-
valuation consumers. Harbaugh and Khemka (2010) analyze this option in a model
of vertical dierentiation with a continuum of consumer types. Targeted enforce-
ment is modeled as a costly device that allows the rm to create two distinct groups
of consumers: Those consumers who are targeted are willing to pay a high premium
on originals, while the others do not face any risks and are essentially not willing
to pay a premium for originals. This means that a model with a continuum of
types and targeted enforcement becomes a model with essentially two types, the
group sizes being determined by the scope of the enforcement policy. The interest-
ing nding in such a framework is that the optimal monopoly price with targeted
enforcement may be above the monopoly price without piracy, pM. As Harbaugh
and Khemka (2010) explain, the reason is that with targeted enforcement and pos-
itive enforcement costs, the monopolist may not want to apply enforcement up to
the level of the demand that would be served by the monopolist without piracy
but may want to choose a more limited scope. Then, if enforcement is suciently
eective to deter the targeted consumer segment from copying, prices are above pM
since only high-valuation consumers can be \convinced" to buy the original.
In Cremer and Pestieau (2009), a monopolist sells a digital product in two
versions. These versions are targeted at two dierent types of consumers (which
the rm cannot observe): High-valuation (j = 1) and low-valuation consumers
(j = 2). Facing the price-quality pairs (pL;qL) and (pH;qH), consumers derive
utility uj(qi)   pi, i = L;H. Low-valuation consumers may also make a copy
and achieve some quality q < qH. The quality of the copy is the solution to
maxq u2 (q)   x(q;e), where x is the individual cost from copying. This cost in-
creases in the chosen quality q and the level of copyright protection e. The level e
can be seen as chosen either by the monopolist or by the government (or a regu-
lator appointed by the government): In the former case, it corresponds to private
legal actions or attempts of technical protection (like the DRM systems we con-
sider in the next section); in the latter case, it corresponds to public measures of
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The authors suppose rst that the government is in charge of the pricing policy
as well as the level of copyright protection. In that case, they show that it can be
socially optimal (in a second-best sense|i.e., respecting the incentive constraints
of consumers) to sell only to high-valuation consumers and to let all low-valuation
consumers copy the product. Then, high-valuation consumers fully nance the
product. Although a private rm could replicate such a strategy, it could nd it
more protable to implement a positive level of copyright protection and, thereby,
to sell to both types of consumers. It follows that the private rm implements a
higher level of copyright protection than the government.
In a second scenario, Cremer and Pestieau consider that e is a government policy
determining the strength of IP protection. Suppose that we are in a situation in
which the socially optimal government policy (again in a second-best sense) requires
to sell to both consumer groups and to choose a positive level of IP protection. If
the rm controls the pricing, the best government policy may be not to provide
any IP protection at all. Thus, although IP protection is too low compared to the
socially optimal government policy when the government also controls the pricing
policy, it is the best not to provide IP protection given that the product is sold by
a prot-maximizing rm.
6.2. Technology-based actions.
6.2.1. Facts. Copyright holders may resort to technology-based actions to comple-
ment their IP rights so as to prevent unauthorized duplication of their work. Digital
products are often protected by digital rights management (DRM) systems, which
is an umbrella term for a number of technologies that inhibits uses of digital con-
tent not desired or intended by the content provider.44 DRM systems have thus
the potential to ght digital piracy but also, in a more general way, to manage
how digital products can be used. Well-known examples of DRM systems are the
Content Scrambling System (CSS) employed on lm DVDs since 1996, so-called
`copy-proof' CDs introduced by Bertelsman in 2002 (which could not be played on
all CD players and were later abandoned), and the FairPlay system used by Apple
on its iTunes Store. Recent development in digital distribution suggest that DRM is
on a loosing path since not only Apple but also Amazon and Walmart have started
selling DRM-free digital music les.
6.2.2. Analysis. The basic analyses of digital piracy can again be used to assess
the impacts of DRM systems when they are simply viewed as a way to increase the
copying cost. However, it can be seen from the above description that the eects
that DRM systems have on the production, distribution and consumption of digital
products go beyond the reduction of illegal copying. We review here some of these
eects.
Besides hindering piracy, DRM systems may also increase the copyright holder
prots by allowing him to implement various price discrimination tactics (version-
ing, group pricing and even personalized pricing). DRM tools allow indeed the
producer to dene who can do what with the digital product. This possibility is
particularly interesting for new artists, as Duch ene, Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006)
44As Kiema (2008, p. 305) explains, \digital rights management tools can, broadly speaking,
be divided into cryptography (i.e. the distribution of information goods in an enciphered format)
and watermarking (i.e. embedding information into a digital product in such a way that each
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argue. Because they make it easier for new artists to expose their products to con-
sumers, DRM should not simply be considered as a tool to protect against piracy,
but rather as a key to opening up the market.
A potential downside of DRM systems is that they may decrease the value that
the consumers attach to the original product (for an illustration, think of the copy-
protected CDs that could not be played on all CD devices). The producer faces
then a trade-o between making the demand for the digital product less elastic (as
DRM systems hinder copying) and, at the same time, dampening the demand (as
DRM protection reduces the attractiveness of the original). Sundararajan (2004)
analyses this trade-o and shows that the producer may nd it optimal to choose an
intermediate protection level. In a similar vein, although in the main part assuming
that DRM leaves the quality unaected, Ahn and Shin (2010) nd that DRM-free
is optimal when copyrights enforcement is strong or when the antipiracy function
in DRM is not very eective due to the severe free rider problem. Otherwise, they
show that the use of DRM is optimal for the rm, with the legitimate products
having lower quality than unauthorized copies. Ahn and Shin obtain implications
for the optimal design of copyright law that takes into account the substitution
possibility through DRM.
In a competitive context, the choices of DRM systems also raise issues related to
compatibility and interoperability. For instance, several incompatible DRM systems
coexist for the distribution of digital music; similarly, on the e-book market, each
platform comes with its own incompatible DRM protection. Park and Scotchmer
(2005) examine whether rms prefer proprietary systems or a shared system, and
whether their choice coincides with eciency. The answers to these questions are
ambiguous as the two options may have countervailing eects on prices and costs.
Regarding prices, proprietary systems have the advantage of being a less attractive
target for circumvention attempts, which reduces rms' incentives to lower their
prices so as to avoid circumvention. On the other hand, a shared system may
facilitate collusion through cost sharing. Regarding costs, the transition from a
shared system to proprietary systems lowers costs as the required level of protection
is lower, but raises them because of duplication.
A related issue is the eect of strategic interaction among producers of digital
goods on their choice of DRM protection. In the spirit of Johnson (1985) and Belle-
amme and Picard (2007), Choi, Bae and Jun (2010) consider a framework in which
the interdependence between the rms comes from their strategies against piracy
rather than from direct competition on prices. In particular, the degree of similar-
ity between the DRM systems of the two rms (i.e., the extent to which cracking
one system allows users to crack the other system) is key to determine the type of
strategic interaction between the rms: If the two systems are relatively dissimilar,
the DRM protection levels of the two rms are seen as strategic substitutes as they
tend to move in the opposite direction; in contrast, when the two systems are quite
similar, the protection levels move in the same direction and are seen as strategic
complements. The authors derive the optimal DRM levels, prices, and demand
functions for the original for each type of strategic interaction. They examine then
the interaction between public and private protection against piracy. In particular,
they show that when the rms consider their DRM levels as strategic substitutes,
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reduce the equilibrium level of private DRM protection and to increase piracy. The
opposite prevails when DRM levels are seen as strategic complements.
6.3. Alternative remuneration schemes.
6.3.1. Facts. As we explained in Section ??, an important limitation to a copyright
holder's exclusive rights is \fair use", which permits the limited use of a copyrighted
work without requiring the creator's authorization. In particular, using the Euro-
pean terminology, \private copies" are permitted (i.e., users are allowed to copy
copyrighted material as long as it is for their personal use). In most European
countries, Japan and Canada, this allowance has been coupled with the imposition
of so-called \copyright levies". These levies are intended to compensate copyright
holders for the economic harm done by legal private copying. The logic is thus
the following: As acts of private copying cannot be licensed for practical purposes
by the relevant rights holders, an alternative remuneration scheme, involving lower
transaction costs, has to be found. The chosen solution is to place surcharges on
digital recording equipment and media, and to let collecting copyright societies
collect the fees and pass them back to copyright holders.
6.3.2. Analysis. Although copyright levies are not intended to compensate for ille-
gal copying (they do not constitute a sort of \piracy tax"), we mention them here
because they are likely to have indirect impacts on piracy. Levies, like any sales
tax, create market distortions. By making hardware devices more expensive, they
have the potential to reduce copying, be it legal or illegal.45 On the supply side,
levies represent a alternative source of revenues for producers and may therefore
aect their attitude towards piracy.46
It is along these lines that Gayer and Shy (2003b) study the eect of hardware
taxation on the demand for software. They postulate that consumers cannot use the
software (either the original or a copy) without purchasing the hardware. There-
fore, by making the hardware/software bundle more expensive, a tax on hardware
reduces both copying and the demand for the legitimate software. Yet, if the pro-
ceeds of the hardware tax go to the software producer, a tax increase may benet
the producer. The authors compute then the prot-maximizing tax rate and show
that it falls short of the tax rate that eliminates piracy.
Alcala and Gonzalez-Maestre (2010) compare the consequences of dierent levies
on copy equipment and analyze alternative schemes for allocating their yields. To
do so, they extend the conventional analysis of digital piracy by including three
key aspects of artistic markets that are usually neglected: The predominance of
superstars, the importance of promotion expenditures, and the dynamics of talent
sorting. They start with a short-run analysis where they take the number of super-
stars as exogenously given and assume that there is free entry into the sub-market
of niche and young artists. Piracy is shown to hurt superstars (by reducing their
45Arguably, levies may contribute to blur the boundary between legal and illegal use of copy-
righted work (users may have the wrong impression that the payment of an upfront tax on the
hardware grants them extensive rights on the content).
46Obviously, using `producers' as a general term is an oversimplication in this context. Copy-
right levies have indeed contrasting impacts on the various players in the value chain of digital
products. Roughly put, rights holders and collecting societies (acting on their behalf) like the
levies, whereas the consumer electronics industry hates them. Accordingly, the industry wel-
comed the European Commission's initiative to reform the copyright levies system in the EU.
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earnings and the incentives to invest in their promotion) at the benet of niche and
young artists (whose market share and number increase). Using an overlapping-
generations model of artists, they study then the dynamics of the market and its
long run equilibrium. The number of superstars is now endogenous: Only a fraction
of young artists starting the artistic career show talent and become superstars later
in their career. Hence, as piracy helps more young artists start their career, it also
increases the number of highly talented artists in the long run.
In this setting, the authors uncover two potential negative impacts of copyright
levies on artistic creation. First, by hindering the promotion of niche and young
artists, levies hamper artistic creation in the long run. Second, when levy yields are
distributed in proportion to market sales (which is the most common policy followed
by Western countries), levies strongly favor superstars and, thereby, reduce artistic
diversity in the short run, as well as high-quality artistic creation in the long run.
The latter problem could be alleviated, the authors argue, by allocating levy yields
on the basis of non-linear (in sales) schemes that strongly favor young artists.
To close this section and link it with the previous one, let us recall that the logic of
the copyright levy system relies on transaction costs: The system was introduced
because there were no eective means to monitor (and therefore authorise) acts
of copying by consumers. However, the advent of DRM technologies should lead
policy-makers to question this argument. Indeed, as Regner et al. (2009) note, it
is now (technologically and economically) feasible to design DRM-based licensing
contracts on which individualized monitoring and compensation schemes can be
based.
7. Conclusion
In this article, we have extensively reviewed the theoretical literature on piracy
of information products. This literature, which started in the mid-1980s, really
mushroomed at the turn of the 21st century when digital piracy became a topic of
intense debate. Our analysis has been mainly focused on end-user piracy, which acts
as an illegal source of competition for right-holders. One therefore expects piracy to
have a negative impact on right-holders' prots. In terms of welfare, piracy is likely
to improve welfare in the short run (as the deadweight loss of monopoly is reduced)
but to deteriorate it in the long run (as lower prots imply lower incentives to
create and to improve products). These conclusions were established in a number
of seminal papers considering a simple monopoly framework.
Subsequent analyses extended this basic approach in several directions. First, it
was suggested that piracy also had the potential to increase the right-holders' prof-
its, thereby counteracting its negative competition eect; a number of ways were
described by which pirated copies could increase the value of original products either
by solving an experience good problem (sampling), by increasing network benets,
or simply because the ability to make copies raises the consumers' willingness to
pay for originals (indirect appropriation). It was then shown that there exist cir-
cumstances where right-holders favor piracy and where ghting piracy could prove
welfare-detrimental. A second line of extension was to examine the eects of piracy
in environments where several digital products compete with one another. Com-
petition between digital products either stems directly from their substitutability,
or indirectly because end-user piracy is a common substitute for otherwise inde-
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same product). These analyses showed that competition may signicantly alter
copyright holders' strategies towards piracy (and the corresponding welfare im-
plications) compared to what can be drawn from the basic monopoly approach.
Finally, we discussed contributions that consider other responses to piracy than ac-
tions through prices, namely legal actions, technical measures and copyright levies.
To close this survey, we should say a few words about new business models that
have recently emerged in digital markets. A number of papers have described these
new models: For instance, Dubosson-Torbay, Pigneur, and Usunier (2004) review
business models for music distribution in a post-Napster world; Duch ene, Peitz, and
Waelbroeck (2006) examine the potential of DRM for creating new markets. More
recently, Regner, Barria, Pitt and Neville (2009) survey and categorize emerging
digital media business models. Interestingly, they categorize the models according
to the extent to which payment and rights are decoupled from the actual distribu-
tion of content. On one end of the spectrum, one nds the conventional models
that we have reviewed in this survey: These models are based on strong DRM and
imply a strong link between payment, rights and distribution (basically, it is the
conventional oine retail model that is translated online). As an alternative, vari-
ous industry players have tried subscription-based business models, which, however,
also tend to rely on strong DRM. When one moves along the spectrum, payment
and rights become increasingly decoupled from distribution. A recent trend seems
indeed to let consumers access digital products without asking for an immediate
payment or, even, without asking for any payment at all. In some models, pay-
ment may be made on a voluntary basis.47 In other models, the content is free but
revenues come from complementary products and services, or from advertising.
The latter type of models exploit the idea of indirect appropriation that we ex-
plored at the end of Section ??. Recall, however, that indirect appropriation applied
across consumers for a given product. Here, what is suggested is to exploit indi-
rect appropriation across products for a given consumer. Indeed, if illegal copies
are consumed together with private goods that cannot be copied, end-user piracy
may be seen as less harmful for copyright owners. In this logic, digital products
can be used as loss leaders that boost the demand for complementary products or
services; for instance, free downloads of an artist's music can be used as a promo-
tional device that increases the demand for concert tickets or for ancillary products
(ringtones on mobile phones, T-shirts, caps, etc.). A number of formal analyses of
such complementary product and service-based models have been proposed.48
As these business models are recent and are developing in a fast-changing techno-
logical landscape, it is not surprising that they have only received limited attention
in the literature so far. Yet, given the importance of digital media industries, the
academic interest in these emerging models is deemed to grow. The present survey
may thus have to be signicantly complemented in a few years from now.
47Regner and Barria (2009) analyze the payment behavior of customers of the online music
label Magnatune; Kim, Natter and Spann (2009) analyze factors that inuence prices paid under
the `Pay What You Want' model and show that this model can lead to an increase in seller
revenues.
48See Curien, Laond, Lain e, and Moreau (2004), Gayer and Shy (2006), Curien and Moreau
(2009); see also Krueger (2005), and Connolly and Krueger (2006), who document the increasing
importance of concert revenues.DIGITAL PIRACY: THEORY 31
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